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Abstract. The contribution of this short note, contains the following
two parts:
– in the first part, we are able to show that the federate learning
(FL) procedure presented by Kairouz et al. [9], is a random process-
ing. Namely, an m-ary functionality for the FL procedure can be
defined in the context of multi-party computation (MPC); Further-
more, an instance of FL protocol along Kairouz et al.’s definition can
be viewed as an implementation of the defined m-ary functionality.
As such, an instance of FL procedure is also an instance of MPC
protocol. In short, FL is a subset of MPC.
– To privately computing the defined FL (m-ary) functionality, vari-
ous techniques such as homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multi-
party computation (SMPC) and differential privacy (DP) have been
deployed. In the second part, we are able to show that if the underly-
ing FL instance privately computes the defined m-ary functionality
in the simulation-based framework, then the simulation-based FL
solution is also an instance of SMPC. Consequently, SFL within the
simulation framework is a subset of SMPC.
1 Introduction
Since the concept of federated learning (FL) first introduced by McMa-
han et al. [1], numerous user data protection solutions leveraging var-
ious security mechanisms such as secure multi-party computation (say,
[2,3]), homomorphic encryption (say, [4,5]) and differential privacy (say,
[6]) have been investigated and published. We refer to the reader [7,8,9]
and references therein for further reading. To the best of our knowledge,
the relationship between multi-party computation (MPC) and federated
learning (FL) as well as that of secure multi-party computation (SMPC)
and secure federated learning (SFL) have not been well addressed. This
note aims to provide an initial insight to the relationship on (S)MPC
vs.(S)FL and we are able to show that
– FL is a subset of MPC;
– If FL attains the security in the simulation-based framework, then
SFL is a subset of SMPC.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 m-ary functionality, MPC and SMPC
We briefly describe the notations and notions ofm-ary functionality, MPC
and SMPC below and refer to the reader [10,11,12] for more details.
m-ary functionality An m-ary functionality, denoted by f : ({0, 1}∗)m
→ ({0, 1}∗)m, is a random process mapping string sequences of the form
x = (x1, · · · , xm) into sequences of random variables, f1(x), · · · , fm(x)
such that, for every i, the ith party Pi who initially holds an input xi,
wishes to obtain the ith element in f(x1, · · · , xm) which is denoted by
fi(x1, · · · , xm).
Multi-party computation A multi-party computation (MPC) problem
is casted by specifying an implementation of the defined m-ary function-
ality. Namely, an MPC protocol is a procedure computing the defined
m-ary functionality. We emphasize that the notion of MPC does NOT
guarantee the proposed MPC protocol securely computing the defined
m-ary functionality. It is possible where no security is introduced in the
MPC protocol at all.
Secure multi-party computation Amulti-party computation securely
computes an m-ary functionality (i.e., secure multi-party computation,
SMPC) if the following security definition is satisfied.
Let [m] = {1, · · · ,m}. For I ∈ {i1, · · · , it} ⊆ [m], we let fI(x1, · · · , xm)
denote the subsequence fi1(x1, · · · , xm), · · · , fit(x1, · · · , xm). Let Π be an
m-party protocol for computing f . The view of the i-th party during an
execution of Π on x:= (x1, · · · , xm) is denoted by View
Π
i
(x). For I =
{i1, · · · , it}, we let View
Π
I
(x):= (I, ViewΠ
i1
(x), · · · , ViewΠ
it
(x)).
– In case f is a deterministic m-ary functionality, we say Π privately
computes f if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
denoted S, such that for every I ⊆ [m], it holds that S(I, (xi1 , · · · , xit),
fI(x)) is computationally indistinguishable with View
Π
I
(x).
– In general case, S(I, (xi1 , · · · , xit), fI(), f(x)) is computationally in-
distinguishable with ViewΠ
I
((x), f(x)).
An oracle-aided protocol is a protocol augmented by a pair of oracle
types, per each party. An oracle-call step is defined as follows: a party
writes an oracle request on its own oracle tape and then sends it to the
other parties; in response, each of the other parties writes its query on its
own oracle tape and responds to the first party with an oracle call mes-
sage; at this point the oracle is invoked and the oracle answer is written
by the oracle on the ready-only oracle tape of each party. An oracle-aided
protocol is said to privately reduce g to f if it securely computes g when
using the oracle-functionality f . In such a case, we say that g is securely
reducible to f .
2.2 Federated Learning Process
A federated learning server (FLS) orchestrates the training process, by
repeating the following steps until training is stopped.
Federated learning procedure [9]
1. Client selection: The server specifies (m − 1)-client meeting eligibility
requirements;
2. Broadcast: The selected clients download the current model weights and
a training program from the server. The model weights and training
program are part of system parameters;
3. Client computation: Each selected client locally computes an update to
the model by executing the training program;
4. Aggregation: The server collects an aggregate of the clients’ updates. If
no privacy requirement is introduced, FL will be called plain-FL (or FL
for short, in this short note).
5. Model update: The server locally updates the shared model based on
the aggregated update computed from the clients that participated in
the current round.
3 The relationship between MPC and FL and SMPC and
SFL
For each iteration j defined in the FL procedure, we are able to define
an m-ary functionality fj for the current round. With the help of the
oracle-aided reduction, we know that FL functionality fFL can be defined
as a composition fn ◦ fn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 of the round functionalities, where
fj is the m-ary functionality for iteration j. As such, for each iteration
j, if there exists an m-party protocol privately computing fj, then by
applying the SMPC composition theorem[10,11,12], we are able to show
there is an m-party protocol privately computing fFL. To complete this
work, we need to define an m-ary functionality for each iteration of the
FL procedure. The details of the m-ary functionality are depicted below.
For each iteration in FL, we define an m-ary functionality:
1. Define m-1 parties selected by the FL-server (FLS) as MPC partici-
pants. Including FLS itself, there are m-party;
2. Define the model weights and training program as system parameter
(sysparam) to MPC;
3. Define initial V iewi as input Di, randomness ri and sysparam for Pi.
V iewi is append-only data type.
4. Define fm: V iewFLS → (sout1, · · · , soutm), where souti denotes server’s
output such that Pi gets its output souti (i = 1, · · · , m−1). The output
of FLS is soutm.
5. Define m-ary f = (f1, · · · , fm), where fi: viewi → souti.
4 Summary
Putting the above discussions together, we get two claims explicitly stated
in the abstract.
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